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I. SETTING THE STAGE
Every American is aware of an increasing need for change in our
lifestyle caused by the sky-rocketing cost of energy. The events of 1973
caused a painful awakening to our growing dependence on foreign
sources of oil and gas. Indeed, the problem is worldwide, with most
countries experiencing an energy crisis worse than our own.
Several factors are contributing to the situation. Worldwide popu-
lation has nearly doubled since 1900; it is expected to double again
within the next fifty years. At the same time, efforts are being made
everywhere to raise living standards. This is accomplished through in-
dustrialization which, in turn, requires a growth in per capita energy
consumption. In the United States, for example, population grew
thirty-four percent between 1950 and 1970, while energy consumption
increased about one hundred percent. The trend is more exaggerated
in developing countries where population grew fifty-three percent for
the twenty-year period, while energy consumption rose one hundred
sixty-two percent. Finally, the most readily available energy sources
have already been tapped, leaving us now with the less accessible, and
consequently more expensive, resources.
The energy problem we perceive at home is naturally the most
motivating factor in national energy policies and programs. Americans
use more oil per capita than any other country, excepting Canada.
This extravagant use of energy is largely responsible for a very high
living standard. (Some would argue that we enjoy a high living stan-
dard in spite of excessive energy consumption. This argument seems
convincing to the extent that we could have an even higher standard if
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we used energy more efficiently.) Now, however, we are being forced
to pay dearly for this practice. In 1973, Americans spent $7.6 billion to
import foreign oil; by 1977 the cost had jumped to $41.5 billion. The
price of a barrel of imported oil has risen from three dollars to approxi-
mately ten times that amount in the past decade.
Due to the importance of maintaining an adequate national supply
of energy, as well as the opportunity for large profits, there has been a
flurry of activity aimed at exploring for and developing domestic oil
and gas sources. On the heels of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, former
President Nixon issued an executive order initiating "Project Indepen-
dence" to address this concern. The impact of this situation has hit
home here in Montana. Energy consultants at a recent Montana
Chamber of Commerce Convention predicted that the oil and gas in-
dustry is about to surpass coal as Montana's leading mineral extraction
industry.' National policy remains committed to this goal of energy
development.
While the past ten years has created hunger for resource develop-
ment, there has been a concurrent demand for consideration of envi-
ronmental concerns. Legislation has been important in defining these
concerns,--most notably the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),2 but also other acts such as the Wilderness Act of 1964,3 and
the Endangered Species Act.4 Moreover, it is certainly an understate-
ment to say that these concerns do not always square with the drive for
resource development.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A major battle has developed in the continuing conflict between
resource development pressures and environmental considerations.
The Forest Service (FS) has generally taken the position that decisions
concerning whether or not to lease Forest Service lands for oil and gas
activities are not "major federal actions significantly affecting the
human environment," and thus do not call for the issuance of environ-
mental impact statements (EIS's)5 pursuant to NEPA. The import of
this interpretation is readily apparent when one considers that the FS is
responsible for managing 188 million acres, or approximately one
fourth of the Federal lands. Environmental organizations and con-
cerned citizens challenged this interpretation.6 The problem is immedi-
1. Great Falls Tribune, May 31, 1981, at l-D, coL 3.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
6. See, ag., In Re: Appeal of Decision Regarding Oil and Gas Leasing in the Pali-
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ate,7 and the stakes are high.
In the Northern Region (R-l)' alone, the Forest Service is respon-
sible for the surface management of approximately 26 million acres. A
year ago, 2.2 million acres of this area had been leased for oil and gas
activities, and another 2.5 million acres (over 3,000 square miles) were
under application for leases. 9 Although no recent figures have been
compiled, it is generally accepted by those close to the situation that
virtually all of the applications have been granted, and that new ones
continue to be processed. Most of this activity is in the Montana por-
tion of the Western Overthrust Belt, which also happens to be prime
wildlife habitat and recreational area. Concerns are further amplified
by the fact that much of the land under applichtion is wilderness or
areas designated for further planning as wilderness pursuant to RARE
II and other mandated studies.
While much of the information presented in this article pertains to
Montana and the Northern Region of the Forest Service, that is cer-
tainly not to imply that the problem is confined to that area. 10 The
Western Overthrust Belt, which has excited the imagination of the oil
and gas industry, runs from Mexico to Canada. Minerals and geology
officials in all affected regions of the Forest Service' have assured this
writer that oil and gas activity is steadily increasing, expecially in light
of recent administrative directives to eliminate lease application
backlogs.
Region 1 is following a practice of preparing individual Environ-
mental Assessments to establish guidelines for oil and gas leasing on
each National Forest. Approximately ten million acres have been
opened for leasing in Montana alone. Region 3 is following the same
procedure. Region 2, however, has decided to prepare one Environ-
mental Assessment (EA) to establish oil and gas leasing guidelines.
sades Further Planning Area, Decision by the Forest Service Chief, Dec. 12, 1980, where the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund appealed a decision to grant oil and gas leases in the PFPA,
made without benefit of an EIS. The FS response: "Looking at practicalities, it is only after
a site is identified by an Application for Permit to Drill (APD) can any meaningful analysis
be made." Id. at 8.
7. "With the increased seriousness of the energy situation, the Forest Service is faced
with a deliberate Service-side reorientation of its mineral program, especially for oil and gas
and other leasable resources." Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, Oil and Gas Ac-
tivity in the Northern Region: An Information Document 6 (1980).
8. Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and part of Idaho.
9. Forest Service, supra note 7, at 8.
10. Oil and gas exploration, drilling and production is also proceeding rapidly in the
Wyoming, Idaho and Utah portions of this area. The geology and terrain of Montana is
similar to these areas. Oil wells in the Overthrust Belt are typically 9,000-12,000 feet deep,
and require transportation of heavy drilling rigs into very remote areas. Id.
11. Region 1, Missoula, MT; Region 2, Denver, CO; Region 3, Alberquerque, NM.
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This EA was issued November 7, 1979, and affects 17.4 million acres.
12
Region 6 issued a similar EA on April 27, 1981, for all non-wilderness
forest lands in Washington and Oregon, at which time there were cur-
rently 1.7 million acres under lease application.
Many people were surprised by the discovery of an Eastern Over-
thrust Belt. This is a recently defined area of sedimentary rocks in the
Appalachian region, running from Virginia to Alabama, where geolo-
gists believe oil and gas may be abundant. A minerals and geology
officer for Forest Service Region 8 has stated that oil and gas activity in
National Forests of this area is comparable to that in the Western
Overthrust Belt. Although the bulk of Forest Service land is in the
West, the problem has become national in scope.
1I. FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASING
A. Historical Development
The first national law to establish policy concerning exploitation of
minerals was the Mining Law of 1866,13 as substantially amended by a
later act entitled "An Act to Promote the Development of the Mining
Resources of the United States."" Several minerals, including oil and
gas, were removed from the Mining Law by the 1920 Mineral Leasing
Act' 5 which applied to all lands belonging to the Federal Government
that had not been privately owned.' 6 Federal mineral leasing authority
was further extended by the 1947 Mineral Leasing Act' 7 which applies
to acquired mineral estates which were patented and subsequently re-
turned to Federal ownership through purchase, donation, condemna-
tion, special act of Congress, or exchange under the Weeks Law.'"
The basic policy of promoting mineral exploitation has remained
unchanged by the Mineral Leasing Acts of 1920 and 1947. The major
changes made were: title to minerals remains with the United States,
which has full discretion whether to make the resources available
through leasing; the United States must be compensated for resource
exploitation by payment of rentals or royalties; monopoly in federal
mineral holdings is prevented and development is required.19
12. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, Environmental Assessment on Forest
Service Recommendations and Consent for Oil and Gas Lease Issuance, National Forest
System Lands, Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota (1979).
13. 30 U.S.C. § 13m, et. seq. (1976).
14. Ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
15. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-194, 201-209, 211-214, 221-236, 241, 251, 261-263, 271-276, 281-
287 (1976).
16. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-359.
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 480, 500, 513-519, 521, 522, 563 (1976).
19. 30 U.S.C., supra note 15.
1982]
PUBLIC L4ND L4W REVIEW
B. Current Practices
Oil and gas leases are issued under two basic processes: competi-
tive and non-competitive.2"
When an area is within a known geological structure (KGS), com-
petitive leases are issued. These leases are limited to a maximum area
of 640 acres, and are always subject to competitive bidding. If a bid is
accepted, a five-year renewable lease is issued.
Non-competitive leases are issued for lands outside a KGS. Be-
cause lessees usually lease areas surrounding proposed or ongoing drill-
ing operations awaiting possible discovery of oil and gas, most Federal
lands are leased non-competitively. In fact, roughly 97% of the lands
offered for leasing are outside a KGS and are, therefore, leased non-
competitively.2 These leases may include an area of up to 2,560 acres
and are for renewable ten year periods. An individual lessee may lease
up to a total of 246,080 acres of federal land in any one state (except
Alaska).22
Rent on non-competitive leases is one dollar per year per acre,
while competitive leases are two dollars per year per acre. Lessees are
also required to pay royalties on production of oil or gas.23
C. Decision-making Authority
The Mineral Leasing Acts of 1920 and 1947 have vested authority
for issuing leases with the Secretary of the Interior.24 The agency di-
rectly responsible for exercising the Secretary's discretion is the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM). Once a lease is issued, the United States
Geologic Survey (USGS) exercises the Secretary's authority with re-
spect to on-the-ground operations.
BLM attaches any stipulation to the lease which it deems neces-
sary to protect the environment. This is where the Forest Service be-
comes involved. Since 1945, there has been a cooperative agreement
between the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, allowing the
Forest Service to make recommendations regarding leases on land for
20. Id.
21. COMP. GEN., G.A.O., REP. TO CONG: ACTIONS NEEDED TO INCREASE FEDERAL
ONSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND Development, No. EMD 81-40, at 18 (February
11, 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMP. GEN. REP.].
22. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, Oil and Gas Training Guide 5-4 (1979).
23. Oil royalities are 12 % for wells averaging up to 100 barrels per day and rise to
25% for wells producing 400 or more barrels per day. Half this amount is returned to the
host state (except in Alaska which gets 90%), 10% goes to the U.S. Treasury, and 40% is
deposited in the Federal Reclamation Fund. Id.
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 189, 351 (1976).
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which they are responsible as the surface management agency.25 In
these cases, the BLM has established a policy of not acting on a lease
without Forest Service recommendations which are generally control-
ling.26 In addition, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1947 requires the con-
sent of the Secretary of Agriculture for all acquired federal lands.27
There are several levels of decision-making authority within the
Forest Service itself.28 The District Ranger reviews all lease and permit
applications and operating plans relating to his district. He then makes
a recommendation to the Forest Supervisor on whether or not the per-
mit or lease should be issued and what stipulations should be at-
tached.29 The Regional Forester is responsible for the final review of
recommendations on the lease or permit, which he then forwards to the
appropriate BLM official for action.3" The Forest Service Chief retains
final authority to make recommendations with regard to certain Forest
Service lands, including wildernesses designated under the Wilderness
Act of 1964,31 primitive areas,32 recreation areas designated by the Sec-
retary of Agriculture,33 and irrigation districts. 4
25. This policy was first established by exchange of letters between the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Interior in 1945. Interior Oil and Gas Training Guide, supra note 22, at 5-5.
26. The court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D.
Wyo. 1980) has said that "[t]he recommendations of the Forest Service are always followed
by the BLM with respect to the issuance of oil and gas leases. .. ." Id. at 388. It is also
true, however, that lease stipulations recommended by the FS have occasionally been de-
leted on administrative appeal. See, ag., Stanley v. Edwards, 24 I.B.L.A. 12, 83 LD. 33
(1976), where the Board said it was "insistent that proposed stipulations be reasonable. If
the stipulation is unreasonable, it will be deleted, or the case will be remanded. . ....
Perhaps more importantly, it has been suggested that Congress intended, through
FLPMA, to monitor the Secretaries' actions. To do this, agencies are mandated to develop
rules and regulations governing their policies. "Yet, in the absence of published rules and
regulations, this policy exists only in their 1945 correspondence." Mountain States Legal
Foundation, 499 F. Supp. at 396. As a result, the agencies have been ordered to adopt rules
and regulations in this matter. See, e-g., Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Oil and
Gas and Mineral Leasing on Designated Wilderness, etc., 45 Fed. Reg. 82010 (1980) (Notice
of the proposed development and issuance of standards, criteria and guidelines). In Wilder-
ness areas, the Secretary of Agriculture does have statutory authority to impose reasonable
stipulations, but actual leasing itself is still the province of the Interior.
27. 30 U.S.C., supra note 15. The significance of this requirement is somewhat limited
in the current situation due to the fact that 95% of the Overthrust Belt is outside the scope of
the Acquired Lands Act 1947. Moreover, as noted in footnote 25 the procedure required for
acquired lands is voluntarily followed with respect to other land.
28. FoREsTr SERVICE DE.APrMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE MANUAL
(FSM) § 2822.04d [hereinafter cited as FSM].
29. Id. at § 2822.04c.
30. Id. at § 2822.04b.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
32. 36 C.F.R. § 293.15(b) (1980).
33. 36 C.F.R. § 294.1(a) (1980).
34. 36 C.F.R. § 251.9 (1980).
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D. Environmental Consideration Under NEPA
Prior to the passage of NEPA in 1969, there was little Forest Serv-
ice review of oil and gas lease applications. NEPA, however, estab-
lished a National policy "to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere, and stimulate the
health and welfare of a man."" Federal agencies are now under an
affirmative duty to fully consider the environmental impacts of their
actions in the decision-making process.3 6 Specifically, "all agencies of
the Federal Government shall . . . include in every recommendation
or report on proposals for . . . major federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement"
concerning five specified factors.37 This provision for preparing an En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS) is commonly referred to as the
"guts" of NEPA, and the action-forcing element of the legislation.
NEPA also mandated the creation of the Council of Environmental
Quality (CEQ),38 which has further defined compliance with NEPA
through regulations.39
When an agency decides that an action will not be a major one
significantly affecting the human environment, they do not have to pre-
pare an EIS. That determination is normally made after an Environ-
mental Assessment (EA) is prepared.' As noted above, the Forest
Service has determined that the art of leasing is not, in itself, a major
federal action requiring compliance under NEPA.
IV. WHEN THE DUTY TO PREPARE AN EIS ATTACHES
A. Leasing As A "Major Federal Action S:inffcantly Affecting The
Quality Of The Human Environment"
The Forest Service has made the threshold determination that a
lease is not a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment." The rationale for this determination is that a
lease, although carrying the rights and obligations of a contract, does
not identify any specific actions which will be taken in a definable area.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
37. Those factors are: "the environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, alter-
natives to the proposed action, the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4372(a) (1976).
39. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1980).
40. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4(c) (1980); Forest Service Manual, supra note 28, at
§ 1950.
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Moreover, permits must be obtained before any actual drilling is un-
dertaken. The key is the belief that stipulations attached to a lease
serve to retain agency authority to approve future actions.41 If a spe-
cific proposal is developed, so the rationale goes, a determination can
later be made whether or not an EIS should then be prepared.
Two key elements of this threshold determination which were fo-
cused on early in NEPA's development are "major" and "significant."
It is generally recognized that these determinations are dependent.42 In
other words, it would be paradoxical to speak of a "minor" federal
action significantly affecting the environment. "To separate the consid-
eration of the magnitude of federal action from its impact on the envi-
ronment does little to foster the purposes of the Act, i.e., to 'attain the
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation,
risk to health and safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences.' "
The phrase "actions significantly affecting the human environ-
ment" is intentionally broad, "reflecting the Act's attempt to promote
an across-the-board adjustment in federal agency decision making so
as to make the quality of the environment a concern of every federal
agency." 44 Thus, courts have held that the leasing of federal lands does
trigger the NEPA EIS procedure.45 It is arguable, however, that these
cases may be distinguished on the basis that the leases under considera-
tion were the last remaining obstacle to the ultimately significant ac-
tion, and that the result was more direct than in oil and gas leasing
involving subsequent regulation and approvals. On the other hand,
there have been instances where major federal action had been found
even where further regulatory steps would have to be taken. (Below is
a discussion of cases apparently favoring the Forest Service interpreta-
tion; followed by cases rejecting it.)
A case frequently relied upon by the Forest Service to support
41. See, ag., statements made by FS Chief, Max Peterson, in his decision rejecting the
challenge to oil and gas leasing procedure in the Palisades Further Planning Area. Appeal
of Decision Regarding Oil and Gas Leasing, supra note 6.
42. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTs: A LEGA. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLIcY Acr 74 (1973).
43. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321 (8th Cir.
1974) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3)). But see Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972).
44. Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973). "The sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling
consideration of any and all types of environmental impact on federal action." Scenic Riv-
ers Ass'n of Oklahoma v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69, 75 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
45. Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th
Cir. 1972).
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their position is Sierra Club v. Hathaway,46 where the Sierra Club at-
tempted to force the Bureau of Land Management to prepare an EIS
prior to issuing leases under the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970.47 The
Bureau contended that there was no major federal action at the leasing
stage, since actual development is segmented into several phases (iden-
tical to those for oil and gas), and environmental analysis will be con-
ducted at those stages as specific projects are identified. The court
accepted BLM's argument, reasoning that lease provisions, coupled
with BLM regulations, establish continuing federal control with the re-
quired environmental considerations at succeeding phases of the leas-
ing program.
Although language in this case provides strong support for Forest
Service arguments, it is arguably distinguishable on several points.
First, the opinion is written in the context of deciding whether the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in denying an injunction. The
court specifically noted: "Our review at this juncture is limited to the
propriety of the denial of injunctive relief and we intimate no review
regarding the merits of the underlying controversy."4 Second, the
court limited its consideration to the exploration phase, and did not
have the benefit of argument of prior case law, such as Rocky Mountain
Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus,49 to the effect that development be-
yond exploration could not be effectively stopped. Third, this case in-
volved the Geothermal Leasing Program, which the court noted "has
yet to reach dimensions of specific proportions such that it amounts to a
proposal for major federal action."50 On the other hand, as noted
throughout this article, the oil and gas leasing "program" is well-devel-
oped and has reached enormous proportions. Finally, the court placed
great emphasis on the fact that a programmatic EIS had already been
prepared for the Geothermal Leasing Program, and that the State of
Oregon had also prepared a site-specific EIS for the project in question.
Another recent case appears to affirm the FS position. In State of
South Dakota v. Andrus,5 the Court held that the Department of Inte-
rior is not compelled to prepare an EIS prior to issuing a mineral pat-
ent to a private party. In this case, Pittsburg Pacific Co.'s application
for a mineral patent under the General Mining Act of 187252 was con-
tested by the BLM, at the request of the Forest Service. The court rea-
46. 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025. (1976).
48. 579 F.2d at 1166.
49. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. (1980), appeal docketed, No. 81-1040 (10th Cir. Janu-
ary 5, 1981).
50. 579 F.2d at 1168.
51. 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980).
52. Supra note 13.
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soned that granting the patent would not allow the company to engage
in mining operations, and that any development would presumably re-
quire subsequent permits from the Forest Service for roads, water pipe-
lines, and railroad rights of way.
Of course, this case is not controlling authority in other circuits,
and may always be attacked as wrongly reasoned. It is also distin-
guishable. The patent application was made under the 1872 Mining
Law, which differs from the Mineral Leasing Acts of 1920 and 1947 in
that the latter specifically reserves to the Secretary of Interior full dis-
cretion regarding lease issuance. However, "if a qualified locator of amining claim locates, marks and records his claim to unappropriated
public lands in accordance with federal and local law, he has an 'exclu-
sive right of possession to the extent of his claim as located, with the
right to extract the minerals, even to exhaustion, without paying any
royalty to the United States as owner, and without ever applying for a
patent.' ,13 This is apparently what leads the court to its conclusion
that ministerial acts. . . have generally been held outside the ambit of
NEPA's EIS requirement. Reasoning that the primary purpose of the
impact statement is to aid agency decision-making, courts have indi-
cated that non-discretionary acts should be exempt from the require-
ment."54 (emphasis added). It is unlikely that the Forest Service would
be willing to assert that their recommendation process to the BLM in-
volves no real decision-making that might affect oil and gas develop-
ment. A final case specifically adopting the FS position is discussed
below.
Several cases reject the Forest Service position. A decision directly
in conflict with State of South Dakota, is Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Berklund.5 The district court held that the Secretary of In-
terior must prepare an EIS on any proposed issuance of coal leases
where the issuance would constitute a major federal action, even
though the Secretary had no discretion to reject lease applications when
coal had been found in commercial quantities. On appeal, NRDC con-
tended that the issuance of leases under section 2 of the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of 192056 was a discretionary act. This position was ultimately
rejected, but at oral argument both parties agreed with the district
court's conclusion that an EIS was required.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus,57 a similar situation
53. South Dakota v. Andrus 614 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1980). (citing Union Oil Co.
v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1919)).
54. Id. at 1193.
55. 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), af'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (per curiam).
56. 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1975) (amended 1976).
57. 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979).
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again elicited a conclusion quite dissimilar to South Dakota v. Andrus.
At issue were two flood control projects located in Montana and Wyo-
ming. The Department of Interior began a program in 1967 for mar-
keting water from these reservoirs for industrial uses. By 1974, 658,000
acre feet of water per year had been committed in option contracts for
industrial use.
No EIS was prepared for the industrial marketing program. The
Secretary of Interior argued that the letting of mere option contracts for
water from the two reservoirs was not a federal action significantly af-
fecting the environment; he believed that an EIS was needed only if the
option was ultimately exercised, and supported that conclusion with the
assertion that licensing would be required before any water was actu-
ally withdrawn. This situation closely parallels Forest Service reliance
on APD's, prospecting permits, etc. The district court affirmed the Sec-
retary's position, relying primarily on Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 8
The Ninth Circuit reversed, pointing out the reality that some
commitment had already been made with, at least marginally predict-
able results in the future. The primary emphasis was on the commit-
ment itself, however.
In focusing on the uncertainty of industrial use if and when
the option contracts are exercised, the court ignored the defi-
nite federal action already taken in major commitment of pro-
ject water to industrial use. Any uncertainty about the details
of subsequent use of the diverted water does not obviate the
importance of the decision to divert and the necessity to eval-
uate the environmental consequences of that decision. 9
The court's decision supports a conclusion that the act of leasing itself
is the "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of the availability of
resources." 6 Even though details of the option holder's future use of
the water may not be known at the time of contract execution, "it is
that time at which the government must decide among various poten-
tial users, and in doing so must conjecture as to possible effects of com-
mitment to one user versus another."'" Where there is a present
commitment to resource allocation, a "Finding of No Significant Im-
pact" (FONSI), based upon the necessity of future licensing or specific
project approvals, should be improper.
A similar Ninth Circuit case preceded Environmental Defense
Fund by only a few weeks. In Port of Astoria v. Hodel,62 the court
58. 427 U.S. 390 (1975).
59. 596 F.2d at 851.
60. Id. at 852.
61. Id. at 853.
62. 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979).
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considered whether a programmatic EIS was required prior to execut-
ing the first industrial firm power contract of Phase 2 of Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) Hydro Thermal Power Program, a re-
gional proposal for development and distribution of power resources in
BPA's marketing region. The court held that EIS's were required for
both the individual contracts and for the Phase 2 Program.
In connection with the present consideration of oil and gas leasing,
it is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit required an EIS because
the Phase 2 program was "a long-range regional policy with definite
goals and fixed roles for participants."63 This conclusion was reached
in spite of the fact that only one contract had been entered into, and
that further concrete proposals were speculative; the important factor
was BPA's commitment to a program. The Forest Service and BLM
are similarly committed to a program of mineral leasing.6' If such a
program is normally difficult to identify, this is no longer a valid argu-
ment considering the current management direction to eliminate a ten-
year-old backlog of lease applications which cover millions of acres,
and to expeditiously process new applications within newly established
guidelines.
Finally, in a California case,65 the court initially noted that the
California Environmental Quality Act was almost identical to NEPA,
and entailed the same considerations. State agencies acting on propos-
als which might have a significant effect on the environment were re-
quired to prepare an EIS. The court found that failure to do so prior to
issuance of a conditional use permit was in violation of the California
Environmental Quality Act, even though the facts of the case indicated
that a building permit was subsequently needed before any construc-
tion could begin under the conditional use permit.
In the final analysis, it appears that in a case such as oil and gas
leasing, determining the significance of the Forest Service recommen-
dation as it affects the human environment is largely a question of tim-
ing. In other words, when must a federal agency stop deferring
preparation of an EIS on the basis that it can be done in conjunction
with some later agency decision?
1. Development Pressures/Lessees' Interests
Oil and gas leasing will naturally pose the probability that subse-
quent pressures for development will occur. More importantly, this re-
63. Id. at 478.
64. See, eg., R-I's NORTHERN REGION PROPOSED REGIONAL PLAN AND ITS PRO-
GRAM OBJECTIVES FOR OIL AND GAS LEASING (1980).
65. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super. of Mono Cty., 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d
1049 (1972).
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lationship has been recognized by the courts. In North Slope Borough
v. Andrus,6 6 the court considered, in the context of the Endangered
Species Act, the full scope of possible leasing effects.
The court initially noted that the Secretary of Interior apparently
realized that the ESA required an "expansive vision" of lease sales and,
consequently, had made some attempt to analyze all ramifications of
the lease sale. The Secretary later argued that only the lease sale itself,
not prospective decisions, constituted agency action under the ESA.
The court noted the inconsistency and held that "agency action consti-
tutes the lease sale and all resulting activites.67 One immediate result
of this decision was that the R- 1 Regional office sent a letter to all For-
est Supervisors in Montana. This letter noted that the Forest Service
had been operating under the premise that leases do not authorize any
specific development on the leaseholds, and that, therefore, consulta-
tion with the Fish and Wildlife Service would not be necessary to com-
ply with the ESA. The Regional Office conceded that the court's
opinion "is in conflict with our basis premises.' ' 68 The Forest Service
has limited this admission to compliance with the ESA, however.
The "development pressure" factor was also illustrated in Udall v.
Tallman .69 At issue was whether certain public lands had been with-
drawn from oil and gas leasing. The pertinent language under consid-
eration was as follows:
The public lands within the following-described areas in
Alaska . . . are hereby temporarily withdrawn from settle-
ment, location, sale or entry, for classification and examina-
tion, and in aid or proposed legislation.7"
None of the above-described lands. . . shall be subject to set-
tlement, location, sale, or entry, or other disposition (except for
fish trap sites) under any of the public land laws applicable to
Alaska. . . . (emphasis added).7
In holding that the affected lands were not withdrawn from oil and gas
leasing, the court concluded that such leasing was not a "disposition."
This, in spite of the fact that the first section of the Mineral Leasing Act
66. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980).
67. Id. at 351. The court here quoted language from Congressional debate on the ESA:
"The earlier in the process of a project a conffict [between a species and a project] is recog-
nized, the easier it is to design an alternative consistent with the requirements of the Act, or
to abandon the proposed action." CONG. REc., July 17, 1978, at S10896. It seems clear that
the policy concerns involved here are directly analogous to NEPA.
68. Letter from Buster LaMoure to Forest Supervisors (Aug. 12, 1980), FLATHEAD NA-
TIONAL FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESMENT OF NON WILDERNESS NATIONAL FOREST 75
(1980).
69. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
70. Public Land Order No. 487, 13 Fed. Reg. 3462.
71. Executive Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471.
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specifically states that "deposits of. . .oil. . . shall be subject to dispo-
sition in the form and manner provided by this chapter.. .-72 (empha-
sis added). Of course, one can only speculate as to the motivation for
this strained interpretation of the orders quoted above. It would be
unwise, however, to ignore the court's practical recognition that "the
lessees and their assignees had, in turn, expended tens of millions of
dollars in the development of the leases."73
Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus7 4 provides a
recent eye-opening example of development pressure. At issue were
leases issued after 1978 in areas under wilderness study, and therefore
accompanied by Wilderness Protection Stipulations (WPS). These
stipulations were issued under the authority of an Interior Department
Solicitor's Opinion holding that no development could take place
which might impair the suitability of an area for preservation as wil-
derness, as mandated by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976.75 The ultimate result clearly demonstrates that the administra-
tive solution to the Solicitor's Opinion was ineffective.
The government argues that the inclusion of the WPS with
the lease informs the lessee that development may or may not
be allowed. Such an argument is a poor excuse for the end
result. Once again a lessee could continue to pay rentals and
not be allowed to develop oil and gas. . . . Such a system of
issuing "shell leases" with no developmental rights is clearly
an unconstitutional taking and is blatantly unfair to lessees.76
The threshold question in the case was the issue of ripeness. In
determining the requisite showing of some hardship which would result
if the court did not consider the case, the deciding factor was that many
of RMOGA's members held leases on the lands in question. Moreover,
"[i]rreparable financial harm is accruing to RMOGA's members (due
to the WSP's) because of the loss of monies previously invested and the
halting of oil and gas exploration and development.77 "A lease without
development rights is a mockery of the term lease."7 8 Could the
message be clearer?7 9
72. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
73. 38 U.S. at 7.
74. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980).
75. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1711-1722, 1731-1748, 1751-1753, 1761-1771, 1781, 1782
(1976).
76. 500 F. Supp. at 1345.
77. Id. at 1343.
78. Id. at 1345.
79. If further indication of judicial recognition of development pressure is required, it
is certainly available.
"The court recognizes that a government can regulate without engaging in a taking.
The court also recognizes, however, that when regulation reaches the point of seriously im-
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2. Lease Stipulations
In their consistent rejection of oil and gas EA appeals, the Forest
Service confidently asserts that development pressures, which are as-
serted as development rights, can be adequately controlled through
lease stipulations. As these are the key to Forest Service refusal to con-
sider environmental impacts at the leasing stage, their asserted ability
to lock out unacceptable development deserves more than cursory
analysis.
As previously noted, certain stipulations which are viewed as un-
duly restrictive have been struck down by courts, as well as by the Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 8° An extremely suspect type of
stipulation is the "No Surface Occupancy" (NSO), which prohibits the
lessee from occupying the surface of his lease some or all of the time.
This is essentially what the Wilderness Protection Stipulations invali-
dated in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association were. Millions of
acres of leased land are presently subject to NSO stipulations; in fact,
28% of leases issued in the last 15 years are subject to these restric-
tions.8 The implications of the recent successful court challenges of
these stipulations for federal land management are staggering. Mil-
lions of acres of federal land have been leased without the benefit of
specific environmental analysis and are unprotected from ultimately
unacceptable impacts, since the Forest Service has relied on potentially
invalid stipulations to maintain their control of development.
Court challenges are not the only threat to the effectiveness of
lease stipulations. It has been proposed, as an administrative action,
that leased lands be inventoried to determine the extent of use of stipu-
lations. Stipulations which are determined to be "severely restrictive"
would then be removed. A stipulation is considered "severely restric-
tive" if it is for wilderness protection (WPS), or if it prohibits surface
occupancy on some or all of a lease for at least six months each year.
Of 48 stipulations used by the BLM for surface protection, 15 have
pinging on 'investment-backed expectations', it can constitute a taking." State of Utah v.
Andrus 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979), citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 364 U.S. 590 (1962).
"This court has also noted that delay in preparing an EIS may make all parties less
flexible. After major investment of both time and money, it is likely that more environmen-
tal harm will be tolerated." Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 853, citing
Latham v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971).
See also Memorandum of Acting Regional Solicitor, Rocky Mountain Region, to Mr.
John Matis, Cache Creek EIS Task Force Leader, U.S. Geological Survey (October 10,
1980), holding that issuance of a mineral lease established the lessee's right to undertake
exploratory drilling, and the unreasonable stipulations in derogation of that right will be
unenforceable.
80. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
81. COMP. GEN. REP., supra note 21, at 58.
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been labeled "severely restrictive."8 Again, presently leased land
would go wholly unprotected, without benefit of an adequate environ-
mental evaluation.
It is instructive to note the Forest Service Chiefs response to the
GAO report mentioned above. The GAO made the following
assertion:
With respect to oil and gas, both the Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management have adopted practices which
allow them to continue processing leases without committing
themselves to approval of future development operations.
They incorporate stipulations. . into some leases which give
the agency control over whether development will eventually
be allowed under the lease.
8 3
Although this echos FS rationale for FONSI's in oil and gas EAs, the
Forest Service Chief responded to this specific statement with the fol-
lowing observation:
The discussion seems to overstate the control which the agen-
cies maintain by stipulations. The intent of the (FS) in devel-
oping stipulations is to retain a degree of control over
operations to assure compliance with law. . . Such stipula-
tions do not reserve full control to prevent future develop-
ment. We believe the process of denying operations on the
basis of post lease environmental assessments is more com-
plex than implied. The issuance of a lease carries the right to
reasonable use, and the post lease assessment normally only
considers the "how to."
84
In fact, Chief Peterson stated that the only way to regain total surface
control once a lease has issued will be to condemn the mineral rights
originally granted. This, of course, would be an extremely expensive
proposition, and seems to be foolish to the point of being an abrogation
of public trust responsibilities. Moreover, some of the earliest public
land withdrawals were made specifically so that the public would not
be forced to buy back a resource which it rashly gave away and later
decided it needed. 5
An additional problem with lease stipulations is that the Forest
Service will have to ensure that they are continuously and vigorously
enforced if they are to be effective. The Forest Service states that they
are confident they can control operations and compel adherence to stip-
ulations.86 Unfortunately, this may be little more than wishful think-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 187.
85. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
86. See Appeal of Decision Regarding Oil and Gas Leasing, supra note 6.
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ing. A realistic constraint on all agencies, especially under the present
administration, is budgeting. The Draft EIS for the Proposed Northern
Region Plan identified two alternatives for future oil and gas leasing
guidelines. Alternative A provides for following current direction to
eliminate the lease application backlog by October, 1981. Alternative
B provides for eliminating the lease application backlog by October,
1981. No, you didn't read wrong. In fact, the only difference between
the two alternatives is funding levels: $1.8 million versus $3.3 million.
The critical point here is that the increased funding level is requested to
"assure than environmental effects are mitigated and that environmen-
tal stipulations in the lease are followed.""7 It should be apparent to
everybody that the Forest Service is not going to have its budget
doubled. Moreover, sufficient funds could not be transferred from
other facets of the minerals budget, even if this was desired, since 68.6%
of this budget already goes toward supervision of operations."8 This
admittedly inadequate situation will achieve crisis proportions as lease
applications reach the expected level of three times the current num-
bers. 9 No matter how hard the Forest Service wishes, it just won't
have the money to do the necessary job.
The Forest Service looses almost all management flexibility once a
lease is issued based upon its recommendations. Forest Service man-
agement itself has concluded that, once a lease is issued, the Forest
Service lacks the authority to modify or revoke it-even if approval for
its issuance was an inadvertent mistake. Consider the following
example.
The Forest Service approved certain leases in a roadless area of
the White River National Forest in 1977. It was later discovered that
Forest Service personnel had erred in identifying the roadless area
boundaries in relation to lease property boundaries, and that leasing
should not have been recommended. Despite this error, the Forest
Service determined that the lease was a "valid contract with the United
States," and that "[a]ny action on the part of the United States to de-
prive the lessee of his opportunities to exercise his contractual rights
and obligations would invite a lawsuit involving probable and signifi-
cant monetary damages against the United States."9 Moreover, as the
Forest Service noted,91 "[1]aw and regulations provide for cancellation
of oil and gas leases by the United States only for cause, Le. failure of
87. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Draft EIS for Proposed Northern Re-
gion Plan 55 (1980).
88. COMP. GEN. REP., supra note 21, at 105.
89. Id. at 66.
90. Memo from Craig Rupp, R-2 Regional Forester, to Chief, Forest Service re: Min-
eral Leasing in Roadless Areas, Oil and Gas Lease C-17572 (April 15, 1977).
91. Id. at 2.
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the lessee to meet his contractual obligations." 92 Ultimately, it chose to
do nothing. The Regional Forester, who approved lease issuance, rec-
ognized that the Forest Service might be sued by the Sierra Club for
approving leases which had no stipulations and which did not comply
with NEPA. This did not outweigh existing commitments and basic
principles of contract law.93
The Regional Forester stated his options as follows:
The possibilities as we saw them: we may be sued for the
error of agreeing to lease without special wilderness character
protection stipulations; we may be sued for permitting opera-
tions on the lease without a full EIS; we may be sued for
agreeing to lease even with protective stipulations; or we may
be sued for not honoring a contractual obligation of the
United States. I chose to honor the contract.94
Finally, there is another revealing aspect of the North Slope Bor-
ough case as regards EIS timing. As noted, a recurring theme with
respect to Forest Service policy on preparation of EAR's for oil and gas
leases is that stipulations in the lease will prevent environmentally
damaging acts prior to further Forest Service approval. In other words,
the conditions of the lease ostensibly eliminate major environmental
concerns which might otherwise require an EIS. It could be argued
that the stipulations to forestall environmental impacts themselves trig-
ger NEPA's EIS provision.
[L]ease stipulations are an additional important mechanism
for minimizing the impacts of oil exploration and drilling on
the Beaufort Sea environment. As such, the rationale of
Alaska v. Andrus, requires that the EIS alert the decision
maker to the probable effectiveness of each stipulation and to
reasonable alternative stipulations. However, the EIS makes
no attempt to do this. . . . Without a consideration of alter-
native lease stipulations, the EIS fails to satisfy the require-
ments of NEPA.
95
In Alaska v. Indrus,96 the court held that if adequate operating orders
are a premise for the Secretary's decision to proceed with a lease sale,
the issuance of those orders must be conducted with full consideration
of environmental consequences and alternatives. The wisdom of this
requirement is more apparent upon considering the decisions holding
92. Id.
93. d.at 3.
94. Id. at 2.
95. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp at 349.
96. 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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stipulations invalid.9 7 Moreover, developmental rights, capable of in-
validating stipulations, have been recognized by the Department of In-
terior's Acting Regional Solicitor,98 as well as by the RMOGA court in
its discussion of "shell leases."99
3. Inconsistent FS Statements and Policies
Some Forest Service Environmental Assessment documents them-
selves appear to recognize that, to some extent, an "expansive view" of
leasing must be taken in order to fully assess possible impacts. In one
EAR purporting to defer consideration of anything aside from immedi-
ately direct impacts of leasing, the FS still noted that the probability of
a wildcat well being subsequently placed on any lease block was 1:2,
and that the area in question had been rated 95 for a potential natural
gas discovery out of a possible 100 points."° Furthermore, when con-
sidering the effects the proposal would have on resources such as wild-
life habitat, the FS looked at "traffic, increased public access, helicopter
use, drill pad and road construction and wildcat drilling."'0 1 Some of
which are activities the Forest Service officially view only as possible
results of prospective decisions.
A further indication of FS recognition that leasing does have an
adverse impact in itself, when measured in absolute terms against the
area to be leased, is past Forest Service policy with respect to lease
applications in fragile areas. Until recently Region 4 of the Forest
Service has routinely recommended against the issuance of oil and gas
leases in those portions of RARE II areas within its jurisdiction which
have also been RARE I Candidate Study Areas. 0 2 It has also been the
past practice of Region I to refrain from making any recommendations
at all to the BLM on oil and gas lease applications involving RARE II
areas, other than recommendations not to issue the lease. '0 3 An obvi-
ous question raised, then, is why the Forest Service should have taken
such a position if leasing itself produces no significant impact. More-
over, the Forest Service Manual also implicitly recognizes the possibil-
ity of significant impacts resulting from leasing. "The Chief will not
97. See, e.g. supra note 26; Effect of October 4, 1976 Solicitator's Opinion M-36888,
843 I.D. Nos. 4 and 5 (1977).
98. Supra note 79.
99. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
100. FOREST SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT,
OIL AND GAS LEASING: DEEP CREEK/REORVOIR NORTH RARE II FURTHER PLANNING
AREA 9 (May 1980).
101. Id at 65.
102. Supra note 26.
103. Id
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normally recommend or approve mineral leases or permits in wilder-
ness or primitive areas unless directional drilling or other methods can
be used which will avoid any invasion of the surface."' "° 4
B. Matters of Spatial Coincidence: Programmatic EIS's
The best starting point to analyze this topic is NEPA itself, and
CEQ enforcement regulations. One court which considered the issue
stated that "the timing question can best be answered by reference to
the underlying policies of NEPA in favor of meaningful, timely infor-
mation on the effects of agency action." 105 This belief is also reflected
in the CEQ guidelines under NEPA:
Agencies shall reduce delay by:
(a) Integrating the NEPA process into early planning.
(f) Preparing Environmental Impact Statements early in the
process: 
10 6
The purpose of this part include:
(a) Integrating the NEPA process into early planning to in-
sure appropriate consideration of NEPA's policies and to
eliminate delay.107
Although applying NEPA early in the decision-making process may be
interpreted as not referring strictly to EIS's, some case law, and realities
of certain situations indicate that this would be a faulty conclusion.
1. Segmented Agency Actions
One type of situation where the problem arises is a project seg-
mented into several parts, none of which taken separately will require
an EIS. In Convervation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary
of Trans.portation,108 the Federal Highway Authority had refused to
prepare and EIS on a transportation corridor spanning a three-state
area because of the non-existence of any plans to build the 280 mile,
three-state highway; all that was immediately proposed was a small
segment of road approximately twenty miles long in southern Vermont.
This situation is somewhat analogous to lease issuance where there are
no concrete development plans.
In affirming the "appropriateness of ordering impact statements
for entire development programs when a proposal before an agency
concerns only one portion of a more massive undertaking," the court
104. FSM, supra note 28, at § 2323.73.
105. Scientists' Institute for Public Info. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079,
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
106. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a), (f) (1980).
107. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1(a) (1980).
108. 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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emphasized "the undesirable consequences if each isolated increment is
approved in ignorance both of the cumulative environmental impact of
fragmented growth and of. . .alternatives . *. ..,o" Of course, this
example differs from oil and gas leasing in the respect that the actions
concerning highways would all be of the same nature, whereas oil and
gas activities involve distinct phases with differing impacts. However, a
key element was the Highway Authority's claim that plans for further
highway development were non-existent. The court found little prob-
lem in addressing this argument by recognizing the interest that the
proposed action would generate in later related actions, and resulting
pressures for development.
2. Analogy" Technologies Development
Perhaps the decision which goes furthest in applying EIS require-
ments at preliminary project stages is Scientists' Institute for Public In-
formation, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission. I At issue was whether
a Federal program to develop a liquid metal fast breeder reactor
(LMFBR) amounted to a major federal action significantly affecting
the environment. The answer was yes. The decision pertained specifi-
cally to impacts of technology development programs, but some paral-
lels invite comparison with oil and gas leasing.
To wait until a technology attains the stage of complete com-
mercial feasibility before considering the possible adverse en-
vironmental effects attendant upon ultimate application of the
technology will undoubtedly frustrate meaningful considera-
tion and balancing of environmental costs against economic
and other benefits. Modem technological advances typically
stem from massive investments in research and development,
as in the case here. Technological advances are therefore cap-
ital investments and, as such, once brought to a stage of com-
mercial feasibility, the investment in their development acts to
compel their application. (emphasis added)." '
Once a substantial investment is made by a company exploring for oil
and gas, that will become a factor in later decisions weighing costs and
benefits of alternative decisions. Again, the realities of economic pres-
sure should not be ignored in decisions regarding application of NEPA.
Contrary to the Forest Service position regarding oil and gas leas-
ing, some courts have taken the position that it is the very uncertainty
of future development which requires an EIS. In City of Davis v. Cole-
109. Id at 934.
110. 481 F.2d at 1079.
111. Id at 1089.
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man," 2 the question was whether an EIS was required prior to build-
ing a highway interchange a few miles away from the town. The
Secretary of Transportation made a negative threshold determination,
asserting that the City's claim of developmental impacts was too specu-
lative for meaningful evaluation. This argument boomeranged. "Un-
certainty about the pace and direction of development merely suggests
the need for exploring in the EIS/EIR alternative scenarios based on
these external contingencies. Drafting an EIS/EIR necessarily involves
some degree of forecasting."1
3. Kleppe and Timing Questions
One more element might support the proposition that the appro-
priate timing of an EIS is before the Forest Service issues leases. Al-
though ieppe v. Sierra Club..4 held that an EIS was not required
under the circumstances present there, the Court attached significance
to the lower court's finding that the action in question was not "part of
a plan or program to develop or encourage development"115 On the
other hand, when considering oil and gas lease applications, it is estab-
lished that "the Secretary of the Interior must administer the Mineral
Leasing Act so as to provide some incentive for, and to promote the
development of oil and gas deposits in all publicly-owned lands of the
United States through private enterprise."' 6
A corollary to the proposition that timing of the EIS requirement
should occur as early as possible, is that programmatic EIS's should be
prepared when feasible. Again, the CEQ guidelines under NEPA pro-
vide some support for such statements:
Agencies shall reduce excessive paperwork by:
(i) Using program, policy, or plan evironmental impact state-
ments and tiering from statements of broad scope to those of
narrower scope, to eliminate repetitive discussions of the same
112. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. Id at 676. See No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 85, 118 Cal. Rptr.
34, 45, 529 P.2d 66, 77 (1974); "The very uncertainty created by the conflicting assertions
made by the parties as to the environmental effect.. . underscores the necessity of the EIR
to substitute some degree of factual certainty for the tentative opinion and speculation."
(Citing county of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 814, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 390) Id
114. 427 U.S. 390 (1975).
115. 1d at 404.
116. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, 500 F. Supp. at 392. (citing Harvey v.
Udal, 384 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1967).) It might be appropriate to note here that the Court
did not decide that the nature of leasing, in itself, dispenses with EIS requirements. On the
contrary: "Of course, since the kind of impact statement required depends upon the kind of
'federal action being taken' .. . the statement on a proposed.. . lease application may
bear little resemblance to the statement on the national coal-leasing program." FOREST
SERVICE, DEPARTmENT OF AGRICULTURE, OIL AND GAS TRAINING AID 402 (1979).
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issue. I 7
Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other
closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall
be evaluated in a single impact statement."1 '
Judicial decisions have also recognized the value of programmatic
EIS's and their advantages, such as providing "an occasion for a more
exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be prac-
ticable in a statement on an individual action. It ensures consideration
of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case
analysis.1 19
A request for a programmatic EIS concerning coal leasing in the
northwest United States was rejected by the Court in Kleppe. One rea-
son for the decision was that there was already a programmatic EIS for
coal leasing on a national scale, moreover, there was no existing plan or
program for development of coal resources on a regional level. The
Courts' main concern was with practical problems of defining the nec-
essary content of an EIS without a concrete subject matter. The opin-
ion intimated, however, that a programmatic EIS would be called for
under some circumstances. 120
Two key considerations in deciding the appropriateness of a
programmatic EIS are time and space relationships of the actions in
question. The Court noted its "general agreement with respondents'
basic premise that § 102(2)(c) may require a comprehensive impact
statement in certain situations where several proposed actions are
pending at the same time."1 21 When several proposals are pending
concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences
should be considered together. 122 Since consideration of oil and gas
lease applications occurs at the regional level of the Forest Service, and
since applications have recently deluged most regional offices accompa-
nied by action forcing regulations and policy changes, 123 a program-
117. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1980).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (1980).
119. Scientists' Institute for Public Info., 481 F.2d at 1087.
120. In fact, one commentator has interpreted Kleppe as providing broader require-
ments than previously existed in some lower courts. "One common issue in NEPA/water
project cases is whether the particular project should be treated independently or as part of a
larger plan." See Sierra Club v. Staumm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974); EDF v. Armstrong,
487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1974). These cases hold that no consideration of the entire project
contemplated was necessary, but all were decided prior to Kleppe. In light of the Court's
evaluation of the need for an EIS on the national leasing policy in that case, and its empha-
sis on agency "proposals for actions, the Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases are questionable
authority as precedent." G. COGGINS AND F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCE LAW 323 (1981).
121. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409.
122. Id at 410.
123. Oil and Gas and Mineral Leasing on Designated Wilderness, Congressionally man-
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matic EIS for leases covering the region seems appropriate. The
Kleppe Court also noted that spatial boundaries, such as Forest Service
regional designations, are an additional element in deciding whether to
prepare a programmatic EIS.
Another concept which should be considered is "synergism." This
is a natural concern when world and national events have taken such a
turn as to encourage rapid and widespread resource development. The
environmental impacts from several activities added together may well
be greater than the sum of what would normally have been expected
from the individual activities. It has been said that "when several pro-
posals for. . . actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environ-
mental impact on a region are pending concurrently before an agency,
their environmental consequences must be considered together."1 24
4. Reasonable Expectations
As the preceeding discussion indicates, decisions regarding prepa-
ration of programmatic EIS's will necessarily involve agency judg-
ments based on substantive evaluations. An agency might, for
example, determine that a group of proposals is so unrelated in time or
space as to make EIS's regarding them a "crystal ball inquiry." There
are standards, however, by which an agency must make their determi-
nation. Generally, the standard on review will be one of reason.
25
One court has stated the proposition as follows:
Section 102(c)'s requirement that the agency describe the an-
ticipated environmental effects of proposed action is subject to
a rule of reason. The agency need not foresee the unforesee-
able, but by the same token neither can it avoid drafting an
impact statement simply because describing the environmen-
tal effects of and alternatives to particular agency action in-
volves some degree of forecasting. And one of the functions
of a NEPA statement is to indicate the extent to which envi-
ronmental effects are essentially unknown. It must be
remembered that the basic thrust of an agency's responsibili-
ties under NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of
proposed action before the action is taken and those effects
fully known. Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus
implicit in NEPA .... 26
dated Wilderness Areas, and Administration-Endorsed Wilderness Proposals, 45 Fed. Reg.
82010 (1980). See also note 7.
124. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410. See also Wending v. Bergland, 479 F. Supp. 174, 176
(W.D.S.D. 1979), where the court noted, "The concomitant EIS is therefore of the 'program-
matie' variety required when a series of actions will have a cumulative or synergistic envi-
ronmental impact."
125. See V, infra, for a detailed discussion of this and other standards ofjudicial review.
126. Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 1092.
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The entire decision hinged upon notions of "reasonable forecasting"
and "present expectation."'
127
Timing of the EIS requirement should be viewed so that careful
consideration occurs early in the decision-making process and to en-
sure that we keep a "sensitive eye to the options often imperceptibly
foreclosed by fragmented growth."'128 Discussion of NEPA in Con-
gress indicates that this very consideration was a motivation for the
Act. "Important decisions concerning the use and shape of man's fu-
ture environment continue to be made in small but steady increments
which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous
decades." 1
29
5. Preclusion of Site-Specqfc EIS's
Before concluding on this topic, one caveat should be noted. As
the CEQ guidelines referred to above indicate, one administrative rea-
son for program EIS's is to "reduce paperwork." It has been held, for
example, that where the Forest Service prepared a program EIS con-
cerning their overall timber management policy, EIS's were not re-
quired on four subsequent timber sales; instead, EA's were
acceptable.13 Still concerns as to the individual timber sales should be
addressed in the original EIS. Where a programmatic EIS is insuffi-
cient in relation to site-specific actions, it may still be argued that the
EIS is not sufficiently detailed to meet NEPA requirements.
13 1
In Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus,132 for example, the court ruled that
the Department of the Interior was not required to prepare site-specific
impact statements on two individual oil drilling projects. A program-
matic EIS had earlier been prepared.
On the other hand, courts have found a site-specific EIS necessary
to supplement preceding programmatic statements. In Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States, 33 the court found a
programmatic statement dealing with nuclear waste management oper-
ations at Hanford, Washington, inadequate to satisfy NEPA with re-
spect to a specific project to build 22 tanks for storage of radioactive
127. See also note 113 and accompanying text: where the court said: ". . . it was essen-
tial to consider and weigh the environmental aspects of transportation, as well as of explora-
tion and production, to the extent 'meaningfully possible'. . . before deciding whether to
authorize the leasing program." (emphasis added) County of Suffolk v. Sec. of Interior 562
F.2d 1368, 1377 (2nd Cir. 1977).
128. Vermont v. Sec. of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927, 936 (2nd Cir. 1974).
129. S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
130. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 498 F.2d at 1323, n.29.
131. See, e.g., Ventling v. Bergland, 479 F. Supp. 174, 180 (W.D.S.D. 1979).
132. 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
133. 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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waste. The programmatic statement had not discussed alternative
safety and design features which could be incorporated into the tanks
under consideration. Moreover, NRDC had not waived its right, to
contest these specific design alternatives by not raising them during
comment periods on the programmatic EIS. The court reasoned that
NRDC could not have been expected to present comments with respect
to particular facilities which were unplanned at the time the overall
program was considered.
Cases such as the two referred to above are extremely diverse in
their factual contexts, and if this issue were to be raised in oil and gas
leasing assessments, the fact situation would have to be carefully scruti-
nized. These differences alone do not account for the disparate results,
however. An immensely important factor is the deference which the
court is willing to give the agency involved. Proper scope of judicial
review becomes critically important, and hotly contested. This conflict
is repeatedly demonstrated in caselaw.
V. SCOPE OF JUDICAL REVIEW OF THE AGENCY'S THRESHOLD
DETERMINATION UNDER NEPA
Having discussed the general guidelines requiring preparation of
EIS's, a crucial question still remains: To what extent will courts be
willing to review the Forest Service threshold determination that the
EIS is not required prior to oil and gas leasing? The FS has raised
some issues which, at least, arguably, support their finding of no signifi-
cant impact and, therefore, their conclusion that EIS procedures are
not triggered. If courts are willing to give full deference to this deci-
sion, the preceding discussion is purely academic and of value only as
an intellectual curiosity.
A. Substantive vs. Procedural Requirements
An important initial distinction must be made between substantive
and procedural requirements. Section 101 of NEPA sets forth general
environmental policies and goals. It requires "all practical means" nec-
essary to:
(1) fulfull the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or
other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural and natural aspects
of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possi-
19821
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ble, an environment which supports diversity and variety
of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide
sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
proach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources. 134
Section 102'13 describes the procedures agencies are to use in imple-
menting the above policies. Most notable among those is the EIS re-
quirement.1 36 Although it has been forcefully argued that NEPA
mandates giving value to substantive matters of environmental concern
in connection with major federal actions, recent Supreme Court cases
have taken the position that NEPA is "essentially procedural."' 37 This
distinction becomes quite important, since agency discretion in decision
making is limited only to the extent that the statuatory requirements of
NEPA have narrowed it. In reviewing substantive decisions to proceed
with a project after an agency has prepared an EIS considering the
environmental effects, most courts have adopted an "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" standard.'38 This is a result of the judicial attitude that it is
inappropriate to "interject the court within the area of discretion of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken."' 39 Unfortunately,
emphasis has usually been only on whether the information was "com-
piled in good faith."14
B. Review of Procedural Compliance
Review of agency compliance with procedural requirements is
quite another matter. As noted above, the procedural requirement per-
tinent to this discussion of Forest Service oil and gas leasing procedure
is that of a detailed environmental impact statement for "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
The scope of review applied to this agency determination has fallen
within a wide spectrum of standards, determined primarily by whether
134. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
137. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC. 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978);
Strycher's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1979) (This case may be
an indication of the importance in disucssing standards of review; the parties seeking review
of the agency decision could conceivably have attacked the decision as arbitrary and capri-
cious, but the Court refused to consider that possibility since the plaintiffs had not so labeled
their arguments.)
138. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 498 F.2d at 1319.
139. Strycher's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228. (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 No. 21).
140. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977).
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A few courts have held that agency determination of whether an
action will significantly affect the environment is a question of fact and,
therefore, subject to very limited review. Such holdings threatened to
pull NEPA's teeth in its infancy. An example of such reasoning can be
found in Ely v. Velde,' 42 where the court applied an arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard of review to this threshold question. Another court
has observed that "[a]s an initial matter, we note that the parties agree
that HUD's determination that an environmental impact statement
need not be filed must stand unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'
143
Until recently, the paucity of such judicially conservative decisions
in the context of NEPA compliance seriously weakened their impact.
In Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson,'" however, this standard
of review has again reared its head. In that case, plaintiffs contend that
NEPA and CEQ regulations required preparation of an EIS prior to
FS approval of a mineral exploration program in the Cabinet Moun-
tains Wilderness in northwestern Montana. After preparing an EA
which recommended specific mitigation procedures, the Forest Service
issued a FONSI. Plaintiffs urged a de novo review of this decision.
141. "Some courts view the agency determination as a factual question reviewable only
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA. Others consider the agency judg-
ment to involve mixed questions of law and fact reviewable under a 'rational basis' test,
'whereby the agency's decision will be accepted where it has warrant in the record and a
reasonable basis in law. Still others, a distinct minority, deem the question of applicability
to be purely a question of law reviewable de novo in the courts." W. RODGERS, ENViRON-
MENTAL LAW 751 (1977) (footnote ommitted) (quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471
F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 424 U.S. 908 (1973), quoting National Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill (1944).
142. 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971). It should be noted, however, that the court
recognized that the agency must make some explanation of why the procedures were not
invoked. "If the LEAA, after following the precepts of... NEPA, makes a good faith
judgment as to the consequences, courts have no further role to play. 'We note, however,
that a federal agency obligated to take into account the values that... NEPA seek[s] to
safeguard, may not evade that obligation by keeping its thought processes under wraps."
After similar decisions, it has become standard practice to prepare "mini-EIS's" Id i.e.,
EA's. See also Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
143. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowner's Assoe'n. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.
1975). It is interesting to note that this extreme example may have been prompted by the
fact that the thrust of the case was to keep low-income HUD projects out of certain neigh-
borhoods, the court noting that "the environmental problems of the city are not as readily
identifiable as clean air and clean water." Perhaps the arguably extreme result in Strycker,
supra, note 137, was similarly influenced.
144. - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1981).
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The court, however, adopted defendants' contention that the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard must be applied giving several reasons for
this conclusion. First, the court stated that plaintiffs had cited no au-
thority for their position. Second, "subjective value judgements are so
entwined with scientific data" that the court would not substitute its
own judgement. Finally, the Court expressed its belief that North Slope
Borough 145 appeared to adopt the arbitrary and capricious standard,
although it acknowledged that "the Court of Appeals apparently has
not addressed this precise question."
The Court is Sierra Club v. Peterson also applied the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard to review a FS FONSI, but formulated that
standard in terms of the four factors enumerated above. As noted,
those considerations do not necessarily accomodate a strict "arbitrary
and capricious" approach; in fact, they have supported searching re-
views of agency action. In this case, the court initially indicated that it
would emphasize the Forest Service "pursuasiveness" that impacts
would be insignificant. The opinion concluded, however, with tile ob-
servation that the Forest Service had taken a "hard look" at the issues
presented and had reached a "rational" conclusion.
2. Question of Law
At the other end of the spectrum are those court decisions which
hold the agency threshold determination to be a question of law. The
implication of this approach is important; when agencies interpret
statuatory terms, they are usually given no deference at all, since statu-
tory interpretation is clearly within the court's expertise1
46
A mild form of this approach has been termed as "broad judicial
review," required by "the responsibility of the judiciary to construe
statutory standards and thereby decide whether the agency violated the
Congressional command."'' 47 The practical result is an extensive re-
view of substantive information to see if there will, in fact, be a signifi-
cant impact on the enviornment. Certain parameters have been
established to guide this independent review of possible environmental
degradation:
(1) Only if the plaintiff can show an inadequate evidentiary
development before the agency should the court take ev-
145. North Slope Borough, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980).
146. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); GELL-
HORN, BYSE AND STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 297 (1979).
147. Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972). See also Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d
1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
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idence on the environmental impact for the purpose of
supplementing the administrative record;
(2) if the plaintiff raises substantial environmental issues,
the court should proceed to examine and weigh all the
evidence in determining whether the agency's conclusion
was reasonable that the project would have no signifi-
cant environmental impact; and
(3) it is not the province of the court to review the agency
decision on the merits as to the desirability vel non of the
project. (emphasis added).
1 48
Far from the arbitrary and capricious standard attendant to questions
of fact, the standard of review described here amounts to a de novo
determination of the threshold question by the reviewing court. The
only limitation is that the party seeking review of the agency's negative
determination must show the possibility of an impact.
Although this approach is certainly a minority position, strong ar-
guments can be made to adopt it. Two of the primary reasons that
courts have traditionally given deference to agency decisions are that
(1) the courts do not have a full record before them, and to compile one
would defeat the purpose of administrative agencies, and (2) decisions
should be made by entities with expertise in that area. Under CEQ
guidelines implementing NEPA, 149 agencies are normally required to
prepare at least an environmental assessment (EA) to support their de-
cision not to prepare an EIS. The reviewing court will have this record
of consideration before it, as well as supplemental information. In ad-
dition, the court is the entity with expertise in statutory interpretation;
to some extent, terms such as "significant" necessarily take their mean-
ing from the factual context. Finally the agency responsible for the
determination may have little or no expertise in environmental matters.
Indeed, it has been noted that some agencies may actually be hostile to
environmental concerns.'
50
3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
The preceding two sections considered possible extremes of review
standards. This section will discuss the middle-of-the-road approach
which, not surprisingly, is by far the most common. Under this ap-
proach, interpretation of the statutory phrase "major federal action sig-
nificantly affecting the environment" is a question of law, fully
148. Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 13 (S.D. Tex. 1974). See also Save Our Ten
Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
149. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (1981).
150. "When a court is suited institutionally to decide a legal question on a full factual
record, the case for deferring to the agency remains to be made." W. RODGERS, spra, note
141 at 751.
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reviewable by the court, 151 while application of the term in a certain
context is a question of fact for the agency. 52 Courts adopting this
approach have further divided on the second step of this two tier analy-
sis-scope of review concerning agency application of statutory terms.
a. "Arbitrary and Capricious"
Courts typically utilize the "arbitrary and capricious" scope of re-
view when considering matters left to agency discretion. At least one
court has, therefore, applied this standard to review an agency's find-
ings on no significant impact, under the impression that "[c]ongress ap-
parently was willing to depend principally upon the agency's good faith
determination as to what conduct would be sufficiently serious from an
ecological standpoint to require use of the full-scale procedure. "153
This case is distinguishable from the question of fact cases discussed
above in that the court first independently established the meaning of
"significant." As noted below, this approach can operate to soften the
normal rigidity of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
b. 'Rational Basis"/'Reasonableness"
By far, the majority of courts considering agency application of
"significantly affecting the environment" language to justify non-com-
pliance with EIS procedures have applied a more rigorous standard of
"rational basis." Sometimes this is formulated in terms of whether the
agency's determination was "reasonable."
Several reasons have been articulated for adopting this broader
scope of review concerning application of statutory terms. A frequent
argument is that NEPA's mandatory language affirmatively establishes
high standards for agency compliance. In other words, normal agency
discretion is limited by express statutory language.
Section 102(1) of the Act contains a Congressional direction
that environmental factors be considered "to the fullest extent
possible." An initial decision not to prepare an EIS precludes
the full consideration directed by Congress. In view of the
concern for environmental disclosure present in NEPA, the
agency's discretion as to whether an impact statement is re-
quired is properly exercised only within narrow bounds. Ac-
tion which could have a significant effect on the environment
151. In Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823, 829. (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den,412
U.S. 908 (1973), however, the court noted that even questions of law may not be subject to de
nov review where the agency "determination reflects the exercise of expertise not possessed
by the court." To the extent this philosophy is adopted by the courts, review of FS decisions
may be more limited. Id
152. Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141, 151. (E.D. Mich. 1978).
153. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d at 830.
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should be covered by an impact statement. (emphasis
added).
154
Moreover, this analysis is supported by the legislative history of NEPA.
During Congressional debate of Section 102, it was noted:
The purpose of the new language ("to the fullest extent possi-
ble") is to make it clear that each agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment shall comply with the directives set out in such
subparagraphs (a) through (H) unless the existing law appli-
cable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes
full compliance with one of the directives impossible.
Thus it is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the
fullest extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal
agency as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives
set out in § 102. . .and that no agency shall utilize an exces-
sively narrow construction of its existing statutory authoriza-
tion to avoid compliance. (emphasis added).155
CEQ guidelines have also supported this approach.
1 56
There are other compelling arguments to support this broader
scope of review. It has been noted, for example, that environmental
considerations "touch on fundamental personal interests in life and
health," thereby invoking a special judicial protection.1 57 In addition,
policy considerations suggest that agencies should not be encouraged to
shirk their added responsibilities under NEPA.1
58
Instead of applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, these
courts have scrutinized an agency decision to determine if it was "rea-
sonable." As may be expected, however, there has been wide disagree-
ment regarding what constituties a reasonable threshold decision under
NEPA; the result is an even further split on scope of review.
To determine the reasonableness of negative compliance determi-
nations by an agency, some courts have engaged in a de novo review of
the evidence.15 9 Others have examined the agency decision to see if it
demonstrates a "compelling case" of non-significance.1 60  Further
154. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 478 F.2d at 1317. But f Cabinet
Mountains, - F. Supp. -.
155. CoNFER. REP. No. 765,91st Cong., 1st Sess.- (1969). See also 1973 Wash. U.L.Q.
23, n.15, and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 106, and accompanying text.
157. Scientist's Institute for Public Information, 481 F.2d at 1094; Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. "[IThe standards to be adopted in connection with NEPA should not encourage
bureaucratic evasion of responsibility. The arbitrary and capricious standard would do just
this." Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141, 151 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See also Save Our Ten
Acres v. Kreger, 427 F.2d at 466.
159. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
160. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973);
Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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down the scale of scope of review, it has also been held that a reason-
able agency determination is one that shows by "a preponderance of
the evidence" that there will be no environmental impact.'
61
Some courts have declined as "de novo," "compelling case," and
"preponderance of the evidence." Instead, they formulate their own
balancing tests and laundry lists of what to look for in the agency deci-
sion. For example:
(1) Did the agency take a "hard look" at the problem, as
opposed to bald conclusions, unaided by preliminary
investigation;
(2) Did the agency identify and adequately investigate the
relevant areas of environmental concen;
(3) As to the problems studied and identified, does the
agency make a convincing case that the impact is
insignificant;
(4) If an impact is of true significance, has the agency con-
vincingly established that changes in the project have
sufficiently minimized it.
162
Of course, the standards established by the guidelines above, i.e., "ade-
quate investigation" and "convincing case" could conceivably lead to
results similar to the "compelling case" scope of review; the "hard
look" approach, however, has generally been associated with very lim-
ited judicial review. The revealing aspect of such formulations is the
care with which a reviewing court often examines both the weight of
evidence considered by the agency, and the procedures the agency used
in arriving at their threshold determination. It may be argued, based
upon legislative history, CEQ guidelines and caselaw discussed above,
that it is not reasonable to conclude that an EIS is unnecessary where a
possibility of significant impact has been identified; accordingly, an EIS
must be prepared whenever a project may cause a significant degrada-
tion of some human environmental factor.163 The agency's burden is
substantial under such an approach.
Finally, there is a peripheral matter which also deserves some at-
tention in this discussion. It has often been recognized that procedural
requirements of NEPA are so important that violation of them is, in
itself, sufficient "irreparable harm" to support an injunction. A dis-
torted decision-making process violates NEPA mandates, regardless of
the substantive decision ultimately reached."
161. Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
162. Joseph, 467 F. Supp. at 152.
163. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). But cf. Sierra Club v. Peterson,
No. 8101230 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982).
164. "The kind of 'irreparable harm' which must be shown in order to justify the issu-
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4. Effect of Kleppe on Scope of Review
As noted above,16 recent Supreme Court cases have restricted ju-
dicial review of agency decisions regarding substantive NEPA matters.
These opinions have not affacted review of agency threshold determi-
nations concerning procedural requirements, however. The Kleppe de-
cision stands as the major Supreme Court decision in this area.
Moreover, this discussion will submit that even Klefppe did not fully
rule on agency discretion regarding threshold NEPA determinations.
The commentary following the Keppe decision was abundant, and
almost entirely negative.'66 One aspect which did not receive much
treatment, however, was the scope of review question; when it was dis-
cussed, it was implictly only in connection with the "timing" question
mentioned above.167 This crucial concern was also very lightly passed
over by the Court itself. This is perhaps due to the lack of aggressive-
ness shown by the litigants in this regard.
Respondents conceded at oral argument that to prevail they
must show that petitioners have acted arbitrarily in refusing
to prepare one comprehensive statement in this entire region,
and we agree,
168
With both parties agreeing to this narrow standard, it would have been
surprising for the Court to reach a different conclusion by its own initi-
ative. Certainly, the issue did not receive the extended consideration it
deserves. On the other hand, this cursory examination might justify a
narrow reading of this part of the decision, limiting it to the facts there
under consideration. With this in mind, a careful examination of the
context of the Court's holding is warranted.
The main consideration in Keppe was the timing of EIS proce-
dures. In addressing this issue, the Court examined the triggering lan-
guage of "major federal action significantly affecting the environment."
Their conclusion was that there was no federal "action" involved, and,
therefore, the EIS requirement was not triggered. This conclusion was
reached in the early part of the opinion. It was not until a later section
of the five-part opinion that the Court treated an arguably separate is-
sue raised by the respondents.
Respondents renew an argument they appear to have made to
the Court of Appeals, but which that court did not reach. Re-
ance of a preliminary injunction in these cases can be found in the language of the Act
itself." Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
165. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
166. See ag., 26 Emory L.J. 231 (1977); 7 ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 181 (1977); 12 Land
and Water L. Rev. 195 (1977); 30 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1977).
167. Supra IV, B, 3.
168. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412. In their briefs, the federal agencies stated that the federal
courts had unanimously held this to be the appropriate standard. Brief for Petitioners at 47.
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spondents insist that even without a comprehensivefederalplan
for the development of the Northern Great Plains, a "re-
gional" impact statement nevertheless is required on all coal-
related projects in the region because they are intimately re-
lated. (emphasis added).'69
The Court had initially decided, in a very detailed analysis, that
there was no "action," and hence no trigger. The argument they seem
to address here is that, even in the absence of triggering, the agency
should have exercised its discretion in favor of preparing an EIS. In
other words, the statutory mandate has already been determined not to
apply. In such a case, arguments concerning NEPA's purpose, as indi-
cated by legislative history, etc., are inapplicable to narrow agency dis-
cretion in order to apply a "reasonableness" standard; § 102(c) is
already out of the picture. It is in this light that the Court decided:
"Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agen-
cies have exercised this descretion appropriately."' 7 ° Arguably, this
standard was not meant to apply to agency decisions to prepare EIS's
once it is determined that they are, in fact, proposing some "action."
Moreover, it appears that some courts have adopted this
interpretation.' 71
The prognosis for "programmatic" EIS's is much dimmer. It ap-
pears that questions as to "timing" of the EIS procedure, based upon
spatial coincidence, will be subject to agency discretion, subject to re-
view only under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
The determination of the region, if any, with respect to which
a comprehensive statement is necessary requires the weighing
of a number of relevant factors, including the extent of the
interrelationship among proposed actions and practical con-
siderations of feasibility.
72
Agency "expert" opinions regarding spatial parameters will be given
great deference by reviewing courts. Once an agency decides not to
prepare an EIS, challenging that decision will probably require a show-
ing that it was arbitrary or capricious.
169. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 408.
170. Id at 412.
171. In some cases, the courts have continued to articulate a "reasonableness" standard
for reviewing agency determinations as to the applicability of NEPA. They have done so
without mentioning Kleppe, implicating, at least implicitly, that it is distinguishable. See
Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st Cir. 1979); Vending v.
Bergland, 479 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.S.D. 1979).
172. "(P)etitioners appear to have determined that the appropriate scope of comprehen-
sive statements should be based on basins, drainage areas and other factors. We cannot say
that petitioner's choices are arbitrary." Get Oil Out, Inc., 477 F. Supp. at 414.
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5. Deinitions/Statutory Interpretation
What if a lower court decides that Kleppe requires application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing all negative thresh-
old determinations? Is there any way to ease the impact of Keppe with
respect to request for programmatic EIS's? An optimistic answer to
these questions is suggested by earlier discussion in this topic of judicial
review. Consideration has come full circle to the question of law/ques-
tion of fact dichotomy.
As previously noted, some courts have treated the entire threshold
determination as a matter of law, to be decided in the first instance by
the court. 173 Even where the determination has been treated as a mixed
question of law and fact, the courts have jealously guarded their right
to interpret statutory language.'7 It is possible, therefore, that a court
may be persuaded to interpret statutory terms such as "significant" so
broadly that an agency's determination could easily be labeled "unrea-
sonable," and perhaps even "arbitrary and capricious." A brief exami-
nation of judicial definitions of "significant" is therefore in order.
The definition of "significant" has been subject to many
formulations.
The standard "significantly affecting the quality of the human
envvironment" can be construed as having an important or
meaningful effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of
aspects of the human environment.1
75
(T)he agency in charge, although vested with broad discre-
tion, should normally be required to review the proposed ac-
tion in the light of at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent
to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects
in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected
by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental
effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that
results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or
uses in the affected area. 76
Regardless of the specific language used, the thrust of the definitions
reflect a basic attitude that the phrase should be broadly construed.
77
CEQ guidelines have adopted this broad approach to the defini-
173. Supra, VI, B, 2.
174. Supra, VI, C, 3.
175. Natural Resources Defense Council, 341 F. Supp. at 367.
176. Simmans, 370 F. Supp. at 15.
177. "The statutory phrase 'actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment'
is intentionally broad.. ." Scientists' Institute for Public Information, 481 F.2d at 1088.
See also Citizens Organized to Defend Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540
(D.C. Ohio 1972).
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tion of "significant." Some of the more expansive attributes of that
term include:
(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as
proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands,
prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or
ecologically critical areas.
(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the
human environment are likely to be highly controversial.
(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human
environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks.
(6) The degree to which the action may establish a prece-
dent for future actions with significant effects or repre-
sents a decision in principle about a future consideration.
(emphasis added). 78
VI. TREATMENT OF FOREST SERVICE LANDS IN TRANSITION FOR
OIL AND GAS LEASING
The questionable practice of leasing Federal land without benefit
of an environmental analysis of impacts from the full scope of leasing
activities is cause for special concern with regard to lands being consid-
ered for reclassification as Wilderness. Beginning with the Wilderness
Act in 1964, several studies have been initiated to identify areas appro-
priate for wilderness management. Regardless of the individual statu-
tory authority establishing these studies, the ultimate test for admission
to the wilderness system is found in the original Wilderness Act:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and
his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized
as an area where the earth and its community of life are un-
trammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean
in this chapter an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining
its primeval character and influence, without permanent im-
provements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which
(1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially
unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or
a primative and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least
five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condi-
tion; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other
178. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b). See also W. RODGERS, supra, note 141 at 752.
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features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historic value. 179
The ability of areas currently being studiel for wilderness designation
to meet these criteria may very likely be destroyed by oil and gas activ-
ity. As noted above, the FS realizes this potential and is attempting to
protect wilderness study areas through reliance on "WPS" (Wilderness
Protection) and "NSO" (No Surface Occupancy) stipulations.
A. Vehicles for Reclassfcation
An area may be reclassified as Wilderness in several ways. Each
classification system has been treated individually in management deci-
sions, as well as in caselaw, and will be considered separately for the
purpose of lease restrictions.
1. Wilderness Act of 1964
The first officially designated "wilderness" area was established by
administrative action in 1924. This area consisted of 700,000 acres of
the Gila National Forest in New Mexico. 1 0 In succeeding years, other
areas valuable for their wilderness resource were managed as "wild",
"wilderness" or "canoe" areas. Despite these developments, however,
there was general concern over the possibility that these administra-
tively created preserves could just as easily be wiped out by the stroke
of the administrative pen. In fact, such reversals did frequently occur,
even in the Gila Wilderness. The response was wilderness legislation
to establish Congressional designation and protection of
wildernesses.1
8 1
The Wilderness Act"8 2 became law on September 3, 1964. It estab-
lished two methods of wilderness classification. First, 54 areas, com-
prising 9.1 million acres which had previously been designated as
"wild", "wilderness" or "canoe" areas, became instant wilderness ar-
eas. 1 3 Second, the Act mandated a ten year study of another 5.4 mil-
lion acres then classified as "primative".1&I The purpose of this study
was to provide recommendations to the President on the "suitability or
non-suitability" of these areas for designation as wilderness; the Presi-
dent, in turn, was to make his recommendations to Congress for final
action. 1 5 Although the ten year study period is now over, some of
179. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1976).
180. See COGGINS AND WILKINSON, supra note 120, at 766.
181. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976).
182. Id
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1976). Similar studies were also mandated for all roadless
areas in the National Wildlife System, as well as all National Park Service roadless areas
larger than 5,000 acres.
185. Id
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these areas were included in subsequent studies and this language con-
tines to be the subject of controversy with respect to oil and gas leasing
in wilderness planning areas.186
Since all present wilderness studies are still geared toward
designating lands under the provisions of the Wilderness Act, some at-
tention to judicial construction of that act is warranted. In Parker v.
United States,'87 the Secretary of Agriculture sought to overturn a
lower court's injunction against a timber sale on the grounds that the
Wilderness Act had not so limited his discretionary authority. The pro-
posed timber sale was not within a Wilderness, nor was it within a des-
ignated Primitive area; rather, it was in an area contiguous to such
Wilderness and Primitive areas.
In a decision which may still be highly important today, the court
first noted that the general purpose of the Act was to "proceed slowly"
with development until the proper balance for all uses could be deter-
mined. It also emphasized the following language in the Act:
Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in propos-
ing, as part of his recommendations to Congress, the altera-
tion of existing boundaries of primative areas or
recommending the addition of any contiguous area of na-
tional forest lands predominatly of wilderness value.1
8 8
The court upheld the conclusion that the Secretary's timber sale would
have the effect of foreclosing options for the President in his recom-
mendations to Congress regarding wilderness designation. This hold-
ing supports the proposition that oil and gas leasing should not occur in
areas under study for wilderness designation until a final resource allo-
cation decision is made. It is undisputed, even by the Forest Service,
that such activity may foreclose the option of wilderness designation.
2. Roadless Area Review Evaluation (RA4RE)
An indirect offshoot of the Wilderness Act was the RARE pro-
grams: RARE I and RARE II. Although the Wilderness Act did not
specifically require wilderness study of other than Primative areas, the
FS administratively initiated a study process to complement the evalu-
ation of Primative areas. The Parker decision illustrated the need for
such comprehensive studies; Parker placed a cloud on the Secretary's
discretionary management authority.
RARE I was begun in 1976. This program sought to inventory
roadless areas either larger than 5,000 acres or contiguous to Wilder-
ness and Primitive areas. The long-range goal was to determine which
186. See Infra VI, B.
187. 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. de&, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
188. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1976).
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areas should be managed for wilderness, and which should be managed
under the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960.189 56 million
acres were inventoried and 12.3 million of those were ultimately rec-
ommended for wilderness management.
RARE I was intensely criticized as inadequate.' 0 When the For-
est Service attempted to implement guidelines for those areas excluded
from wilderness management by RARE I, they were promptly sued. In
Sierra Club v. Butz, 9 ' the Forest Service was enjoined from issuing
timber contracts on RARE I lands until an EIS was complete. In Wyo-
ming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz,'92 a similar holding en-
joined pre-RARE timber sales pending compliance with NEPA. The
Final EIS on RARE I was issued in October 1973. after which RARE I
was quietly abandoned.
RARE II resurrected the RARE process in 1977. The Forest Serv-
ice asserted that this new evaluation was part of the broad planning
process mandated by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974191 and the National Forest Management Act of
1976.114 In contrast with RARE I, 62 million acres were inventoried,
15.5 million of those were recommended for immediate wilderness
classification, and another 10.8 million were recommended for "further
planning" as wilderness. One crucial difference between the two pro-
grams is that RARE II identified areas for immediate wilderness rec-
ommendation, whereas RARE I had merely identified areas which
should be managed for their wilderness resource.
Rare II resulted in classifications of specified areas as "wilder-
ness", "non-wilderness" and "further planning." Of course, the agency
was soon authorized to independently create wildernesses. Rare II
Wilderness designation is simply a recommendation to Congress for
inclusion of an area in the Wilderness Preservation System under the
Wilderness Act of 1964. Non-wilderness designation on the other
hand, does administratively preclude an area from further wilderness
consideration and exposes that area to other resource management or
development. A further planning designation is essentially, a "non-de-
cision", leaving further uses of the land, including wilderness use, to
189. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1976).
190. Many suitable areas were not even inventoried. For example, a 28,000 acre water-
shed area in the Lolo National Forest southeast of Missoula, MT, was not mentioned in the
inventory. To the embarassment of the FS, that area is now officially designated as the
Welcome Creek Wilderness.
191. 3.E.L.R. 20071 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
192. 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
193. 16 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. (1976).
194. Id
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later determination under the Forest Service's routine land use plan-
ning processes.
"Programmatic" Draft and Final Environmental Impact State-
ments were prepared to support the ultimate RARE II allocation deci-
sions. The Draft, (consisting of a national document which contains an
overview of the RARE II process and alternatives under consideration
and State or geographical area supplements which provide more spe-
cific information on individual roadless areas) was made available to
the public on June 15, 1978. The DEIS identified 10 alternatives,
which would designate no more than 34% of the total areas under con-
sideration as wilderness and an eleventh alternative, which would des-
ignate 100% of the study area as wilderness.
The final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was filed on
January 4, 1979. It identified, for the first time, the Forest Service pro-
posed action which would result in nationwide allocations of 15 million
acres to wilderness, 36 million acres to non-wilderness and 10.8 million
acres to further planning. Public comment on the proposed action
identified in FEIS was not permitted.
In 1979, the State of California challenged the Forest Service's
compliance with NEPA in preparation of the Draft and Final EIS and
also alleged, violation of the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act and
the National Forest Management Act of 1976. In Calfornia v. Berg-
land"'95 the Court found it unnecessary to reach the issues surrounding
violation of the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act and of the Na-
tional Forest Management Act. It held that, because RARE II non-
wilderness designation precludes further review of an area for wilder-
ness, it is a major federal action having significant effect on the human
environment for which NEPA requires a site specific EIS. Moreover,
the court found that the RARE II programmatic EIS failed to contain a
site specific analysis of the impacts of non-wilderness designation and,
therefore, that the Forest Service RARE II EIS failed to comply with
NEPA's mandates.
Finally, the court found that the Forest Service's Wilderness Attri-
bute Rating System (WARS) is skewed against wilderness and utilizes a
comparative approach whereby the wilderness values of each area are
pitted against those of other areas, thus violating the mandate of the
Wilderness Act that requires consideration of intrinsic, not compara-
tive, wilderness values. The opinion also finds that the Forest Service
did not examine a reasonable range of alternatives in considering dis-
position of the RARE II areas, since no alternatives allocating wilder-
ness to more than 34% and less than 100% of the total areas were
195. 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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considered. Finally, the court ruled that the Forest Service had failed
to adequately respond to comments on the Draft Environmental Im-
pact Statement and failed to provide an opportunity for meaningful,
public comment on the final decision in a manner required by NEPA.
The Forest Service has appealed this decision.
3. Individual Wilderness Study Acts
As a result of dissatisfaction with the RARE process, widely scat-
tered local pressures have resulted in the passage of a numbei of special
wilderness study acts dealing with individual wilderness areas. A more
comprehensive example of these efforts in the Eastern Wilderness Act
of 1975.196
The Montana Wilderness Study Act1 97 was signed into law,
against the wishes of the FS, on November 1, 1977. The Act creates
nine study areas in Montana, consisting of 973,000 acres. Interestingly,
the Sierra Club is aligned with the Forest Service in their criticism of
the Act. They reason that, had the areas been recommended for wil-
derness designation, presently, the fate of these areas would not be so
uncertain.
The Montana Wilderness Study Areas are distinct from RARE II
areas in at least one crucial respect. Any recommendation for oil and
gas leasing must come from the Forest Service Chief, rather than the
Regional Forester. This is a recognition of the Congressionally man-
dated status of these areas.
4. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
The final major vehicle for wilderness classification was estab-
lished by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA). 198 Section 603 of FLPMA'9 9 requires the BLM to under-
take a wilderness review of all lands managed by it. All roadless areas
larger than 5,000 acres are to be studied. By 1991, the results of these
studies must be reported to the President, who then has an additional
two years to make recommendations to Congress. In contrast to the 62
million acres of RARE II, the initial BLM inventory identified 174 mil-
lion acres for study. At present, BLM has already eliminated 150 mil-
lion acres from further study, claiming that they lack sufficient
wilderness characteristics. The remaining area has been designated
Wilderness Study Areas (WSA), and is currently in the second stage of
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).
197. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. II 1978).
198. 43 U.S.C. § 1701, eL seq. (1976).
199. 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976).
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the BLM review process. Final recommendations are expected long
before the 1991 deadline.
In 1979, the first case construing BLM's authority to manage
WSA's under FLPMA was decided. In State of Utah v. Andrus,2° the
issue was whether BLM had authority to prevent the State of Utah's
lessee (Cotter Corporation) from building roads to its mining claims on
leased state school trust lands; this access had been denied because the
state lands were locked inside BLM lands which were being studied for
wilderness classification pursuant to FLPMA.
Specifically, the court was faced with determining the meaning of
the following language:
[I]n a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas/or
preservation as wilderness, subject, however to the continua-
tion of existing mining . . .uses. . .in the manner and degree in
which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976:
Provided, That, in managing the public lands [BLM] shall by
regulation or otherwise take any action required to prevent un-
necessary or undue degradation of the lands and their re-
sources or to afford environmental protection. °1
The appellants contended that this provision established "non-impair-
ment as a general policy statement, but gave BLM actual management
authority only to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands under study. Of course, the "unnecessary" language is subject to
modification in regard to uses such as mining, whereas non-impairment
is a much more absolute standard.
The court ultimately determined that BLM has two types of au-
thority: 1) as to lands which were subject to actual uses before FLPMA
(as opposed to rights to use), BLM may regulate so as to prevent unnec-
essary or undue degradation of the WSA, keeping in mind reasonable
requirements of the activity; 2) as to lands which were not subject to
preexisting actual uses, BLM may regulate so as to prevent impairment
of wilderness characteristics. Even the strict nonimpairment standard
is subject to an important limitation, however. "[S]uch regulation can-
not be so restrictive as to constitute a taking
'202
B. Recent Caselaw Developments
As deadlines for wilderness designation approach, developers feel
a sense of urgency to establish a lease position in wilderness study ar-
eas. Deregulation and ever higher oil and gas prices also fuel the rush
for mineral exploration in wilderness study areas. At the same time,
200. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
201. Id at 1003.
202. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, 500 F. Supp. at 1343.
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conservation groups are maintaining their anxious vigilance over these
areas. The result is a body of caselaw relating to wilderness transition
lands in the context of oil and gas leasing.
1. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus
203
In the summer of 1977, Region 2 of the Forest Service proposed to
issue oil and gas leases in a pristine area of the Teton National Forest
in northwestern Wyoming. Part of this area was under study for wil-
derness designation by the then new RARE II. The Sierra Club filed
an administrative appeal with the Department of Agriculture which
was ultimately dismissed. Before the issue was taken to court, however,
representatives from Forest Service Regions 1 and 2 and the Sierra
Club met in Denver and agreed that no leases Would be issued in most
RARE II areas pending completion of the evaluation. Interior Secre-
tary James Watt, then head of the Mountain States Legal Foundation
called this arrangement "paralysis by analysis" and challenged it in
court. In October 1980, the Wyoming federal district court issued its
decision.
FLPMA requires that the Secretary must report any withdrawal
greater than 5,000 acres to Congress before it is implemented.2" A
withdrawal is defined as:
"the withholding in the area of Federal land from settle-
ment, sale, location, or entry, under some or all of the general
land laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under those
laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or
reserving the area for a particular public use or program
,,205
MSLF argued that, based upon these two provisions, and the general
intent of FLPMA, the Secretaries had made an illegal defacto with-
drawal. Judge Brimmer agreed.
As noted above, this language---"settlement, sale, location, or en-
try"- is the very language which was determined not to amount to a
withdrawal of lands from operation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
in Udall v. Tallman.2" This apparently irreconcilable inconsistency
can perhaps best be explained as another example of the distortions
which can be caused by development pressures.
The court further rejected the contention that the Secretaries had
authority to make such a temporary management withdrawal under the
Wilderness Act and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. As to the latter,
203. 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980).
204. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1976).
205. 43 U.S.C. § 17020) (1976).
206. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
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the court concluded that the Secretary of Interior actually had an obli-
gation under the Mineral Leasing Act to "provide some incentive for,
and to promote the development of oil and gas deposits in all publicly-
owned lands of the United States through private enterprise."2"7 The
answer to the Wilderness Act claim was simple:
It would surely be inconsistent with the intent to keep lands
designated as wilderness areas open until December 31, 1983,
that lands merely under administrative study for a proposed
wilderness area may be effectively withdrawn from the leasing
without the consent of Congress.
20 8
The practical result of this decision was that the Forest Service
decided to proceed with the leasing process in RARE II Further Plan-
ning Areas (FPA's). Again, they have declined even to prepare an EIS,
placing great emphasis on arguments that any leases issued would carry
an "FPA stipulation" which puts the lessee on notice that he may never
be able to develop his lease if the area is ultimately designated a
Wilderness.
2. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus209
Three weeks after the MSLF decision, Judge Kerr, also of the Wy-
oming Federal District Court, issued his decision in Rocky Mountain
Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus21 (RMOGA). Although these cases
are significant in their own right, they become much more important
when considered together.
As in State of Utah v. Andrus,2 1 the RMOGA court was faced with
construing BLM's authority under § 603(c) of FLPMA. The Solicitor
General for the Interior Department had issued an opinion which inter-
preted FLPMA as establishing a "non-impairment" standard for Wil-
derness Study Areas. This opinion formed the basis for BLM's Interim
Management and Policy Guidelines for Wilderness Review (IMPS).
These IMP's prohibited development of oil and gas leases within
WSA's, much like FPA stipulations currently relied upon by the FS. In
a result clearly contrary to prior caselaw, the court struck down the
Solicitor's Opinion and BLM's IMP's as conflicting with the require-
ments of FLPMA. Even the non-impairment standard was determined
to be subject to existing mining uses. The logical result is that there are
no longer two standards for pre- and post-FLPMA actual uses; instead,
207. Mountain States Legal Foundation, 499 F. Supp. at 392.
208. Id at 393.
209. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980).
210. Id
211. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
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the "impairment" standard is subject to the same modifiers as the "un-
necessary and undue degradation" standard.
The court summarily dismissed conflicting prior caselaw. Utah v.
Andrus, it said, was distinguishable since it dealt with access to school
trust lands. Although this is true, the Utah court has also gone to great
lengths to set out BLM's authority with respect to both the State and
private parties; it had also been concerned with mining claims held by
Cotter Corporation on Federal land.
Parker v. United States212 was likewise distinguished as involving
timber harvesting. Again, regardless of the context of the case, the ba-
sic issue of preserving wilderness characteristics of an area during wil-
derness studies was identical. Perhaps realizing the tenuousness of
their position, the RMOGA court went on to say:
Although this alone would be sufficient to condemn the Solic-
itor's misplaced reliance on Parker, the Senate Committee
Report specifically states that the language of Section 201(a)
of FLPMA was included to bar suits similar to Parker v.
United States, S. Rep. No. 873, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36
(1974). " 1
In this connection, note the following observation by the Utah court:
"Amicus American Mining Congress has cited a portion of
legislative history indicating that Congress inserted section
202 into FLPMA with the intent of overruling the Parker
case. It should be noted, however, that the statement quoted
by the amicus is from the Senate Committee Report on Sen-
ate Bill 424, a bill that was debated some time prior to the
debate and passage of FLPMA. Perhaps more important, the
final statement of the Senate intent behind including Section
201 contains language almost identical to that quoted by the
amiscus, but does not include any reference to the Parker case.
The fact that this language was omitted from the subsequent
statements of legislative intent argues that Congress, in fact,
did not intend to overrule Parker.21 4
This finding was either overlooked or ignored by Judge Brimmer.
Even if the IMOGA court had decided to adopt the Utah dual
standard under section 1714(c), it must be remembered that the Utah
court held that, even under the stringent non-impairment standard,
regulation could not become so restrictive as to constitute taking. The
JMOGA court determined that precluding a lessee from developing
his lease does constitute a taking.215 This holding clearly squares with
212. 448 F.2d at 793.
213. 500 F. Supp. at 1342.
214. 486 F. Supp. at 1007, n.16.
215. 500 F. Supp. at 1338.
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the sentiment of oil and gas industry officials. For example, Jim Short
of Williams Exploration, a firm exploring for oil and gas in the Mon-
tana Overthrust Belt, has bluntly suggested, "If they didn't want us to
develop this land, they shouldn't have leased it to us. We have been
paying for these leases for 12 years. Are they willing to give us our
money back with interest?2 16 This is a simple and appealing argument.
Moreover, it has now gained legal support.
BLM has conceded the aspect of the RMOGA decision relating to
pre-FLPMA leases, but the Department of Justice has filed an appeal
of the remainder in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 7,
1981. The Sierra Club has also filed an appeal on the issues conceded
by BLM.
3. Sierra Club v. Peterson
2 1 7
The Palisades is a roadless area comprised of 247,090 acres situ-
ated partly in the Targhee National Forest of Idaho (111,250 acres) and
partly in the Targhee (91,380 acres) and Bridger-Teton (44,460 acres)
National Forests of Wyoming. RARE II allocated this area to FPA
status. The BLM requested recommendations from the FS on lease
applications which cover this entire area. On June 5, 1980, the Re-
gional Forester for Region 2 recommended full leasing of the Palisades
after issuing a FONSI. The Sierra Club immediately appealed this de-
cision to the FS Chief.
On administrative appeal, two basic issues were raised. The first
was based on RARE II, although it did not directly attack it. The
RARE II FEIS had indicated a general policy of exploring for oil and
gas in FPA's to assess their mineral potential prior to final designation.
In furthernace of this policy, it set forth several stipulations which
should be used to protect wilderness characteristics. The Sierra Club
sought closer adherence to these stipulations on a "lesser-of-two-evils"
theory. The second argument was that oil and gas leasing is a major
federal action and requires preparation of an EIS.
The Chief responded on December 29, 1980, rejecting the Sierra
Club arguments. After a brief analysis of the stipulations used in the
Palisades leases, the Chief summarily concluded that they would pro-
vide sufficient protection.
The real issue here is the issuance of leases with conditional
stipulations to protect the environment in the event that actual
drilling takes place. Appellant is assured that before any ac-
tivities can take place, a site-specific analysis (EA or EIS) will
216. The Missoulian, May 24, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
217. - F. Supp. -, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982).
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be prepared.218
Despite good intentions, it has become obvious that the Chief may be
in no position to fulfill his assurances. The real issue does, indeed, ap-
pear to be the stipulations. The preceeding discussion, however, indi-
cates that these stipulations may be unenforceable. It is possible that
any site-specific analysis would be an exercise in futility since actual
development could not be prevented. Moreover, current pressures on
administrators may well result in categorical exclusions from environ-
mental analysis for noncompetive lease applications and Applications
for Permits to Drill.
The thrust of the Chiefs decision is summed up in the following
twisted logic:
In the Palisades, if valuable oil and gas resources are found,
then the wilderness option might have to be forgone. On the
other hand, if little or no oil and gas is found, a decision for
wilderness classification would be an informed one. (empha-
sis added)
219
Obviously, the underlying resource allocation decision has already
been made; the information would merely support a predetermined re-
sult. The Sierra Club decided to challenge this situation. In Sierra
Club the court applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of re-
view to conclude that the decision to delay preparation of appropriate
EIS's until site-specific development proposals are submitted did com-
ply with Forest Service NEPA obligations. The Forest Service argued
that NSO and FPA stipulations attached to the leases eliminated the
possiblity of significant affects prior to further study. The Sierra Club
countered that RAfOGA made such stipulations unenforceable. Citing
NRDC v. Berglund,22 the court concluded that the Secretary of the
Interior can condition a lease right to the extent that a lessee may ulti-
mately be unable to explore or develop the lease. RMOGA was dis-
missed as an opinion of questionable validity.
The legal and envirnomental ramifications of the Forest Service
approach to oil and gas leasing are still uncertain. Mountain States Le-
gal Foundation and RMOGA both stand for the proposition that leas-
ing should not be held in abeyance pending wilderness classification
studies. The validity of Forest Service reliance on stipulation to issue
those leases prior to full environmental consideration is unfortunately
uncertain; RMOGA and Sierra Club v. Peterson are in direct conflict
on this point. There is an alarming possibility, however, that the leases
now being issued cannot be subjected to restrictive development stipu-
218. Appeal of Decision Regarding Oil and Gas Leasing, supra note 6, at 8.
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lations. Most pending lease applications have been granted, and new
ones continue to be expeditiously processed. It appears that critically
important transition lands may be disposed of without any effective
protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
The key to this issue seems to be Forest Service reliance on stipu-
lations for ultimate protection of resources. Unfortunately, indications
are that these stipulations may well be unenforceable, legally or practi-
cally. The ultimate result may be that important areas of FS land will
be leased without adequate environmental protection and, indeed,
without even any specific study to determine what would be necessary,
and desirable protection.
Moreover, even if stipulations are enforceable and enforced, their
effectiveness is threatened by shifting administrative policies. On areas
already leased, it has been proposed that stipulations be administra-
tively reviewed and those "excessively restrictive" be eliminated. Ad-
ditionally, once an EA establishes leasing guidelines, the basic
assumptions of those EA's regarding stipulations will likely be adminis-
tratively undermined, but the procedure established thereby will be
carried forward for future lease applications. The result would be the
same as if no studies were ever done.
In conclusion, there seems to be ample indication of the possible
impacts of oil and gas development, impacts which are almost certain
to occur due to current economic pressures. It should also be apparent,
to a "sensitive eye", that the oil and gas leasing process is, by itself, a
major factor in this concern. NEPA EIS's are essential to preserve the
integrity of the decisionmaking process at the earliest stage; although it
may be true that the most informed analysis can be made after specific
impacts are known, dependance on hindsight is an abrogation of man-
agement responsiblity. The oft cited policies of NEPA support this po-
sition, as do the recent court decisions recognizing the overwhelming
influence of investment and development pressure, and the need to ac-
count for that reality. It is time to appreciate oil and gas leasing of our
Federal land for what it really is.
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